Early European and British Studies
Berrios has reviewed the history of the use of the terms depression and melancholia, and it is perhaps unexpected to learn that depression has only been commonly used in psychiatry since the mid 19th century. Further, prior to that time, melancholia had been a general term that, as Prichard stated in 1835, "meant simply to be mad" (2, p 298) . However, there were attempts to more clearly separate out what we now regard as depressive symptoms, and in 1820, the term lypemania was postulated by Esquirol in France. This term referred to severe symptomatology associated with sadness and led to further elaboration of symptoms, so much so that in 1856 Billod described 16 clinical subtypes! It is hardly surprising that, speaking of 19th century authors, Zilboorg should later comment, "to produce a well-ordered classification almost seems to have become the unspoken ambition of every psychiatrist of industry and promise" (3, p 15 ).
Berrios reported that by the end of the 19th century "'depression' had become a synonym of melancholia" (2, p 301) . It is also pertinent that in 1892, in A Dictionary of Psychological Medicine, Tuke commented on the "varieties of melancholia, which the industry of clinical alienists has rendered perhaps unnecessarily numerous, no fewer than thirty varieties having been described by various authors" (4, p 789). Notwithstanding this plethora of melancholias, Pichot and Pull (5) indicated that, when Kraepelin first used melancholia in 1896, it referred to depression in older individuals. However, they quoted Jolly, who in the same year wrote: "It cannot be understood why only melancholias appearing at the involutional Mood disorders have proven to be a fertile ground for nosological debate. Numerous attempts to classify them phenomenologically have been undertaken, but it is doubtful whether there will ever be widespread agreement until more definitive biological markers emerge. Although some individual classifications may have limited utility, the DSM nosology appears to incorporate most, if not all, of the mood disorders encountered in clinical practice. Indeed, with minor modifications, the DSM and ICD systems could be amalgamated to ensure universal agreement in our conceptualization of mood disorders.
(Can J Psychiatry 2006;51:874-878) Information on funding and support and author affiliations appears at the end of the article. age should be real cases of melancholia and why depressions evolving in an identical manner at another age should be considered differently" (5, p 3). Pichot and Pull also noted that Lange, in commenting on the nosological debate about depression and melancholia, referred to it as "one of the most complex questions of psychiatry" (5, p 4) .
Berrios noted that, by 1921, Kraepelin "used 'depressive states' as a generic category under which he included melancholia simplex, stupor, melancholia gravis, fantastic melancholia, and delirious melancholia" (2, p 301). Clearly, the term melancholia survived in European psychiatry in the 20th century, although Pichot and Pull cautioned that it was premature to "affirm that involutional melancholia is only a unipolar depression, without its own particular characteristics" (5, p 9), a prescient comment in view of the DSM specifiers.
It is probably fair to state that, in the first half of the 20th century, British psychiatry was at its most influential, and nowhere was this more evident than in the conceptualization of depression. This was due particularly to the work of Aubrey Lewis (6) , who built on Mapother's view (7) of depression as a unitary phenomenon. Nevertheless, multicategorical descriptions of depression emerged as a result of what at the time appeared to be increasingly sophisticated statistical analyses of symptoms.
For a detailed description of these, Kendell's review (3) is recommended. Examples of the analyses Kendell overviews include the work of Overall and others (8) , who used factor analysis to delineate anxious-tense depression, hostile depression, and retarded depression; Pilowsky and others (9), who defined endogenous and other depressions according to numerical taxonomy; Paykel (10) , who used cluster analysis to define psychotic depressives, anxious depressives, hostile depressives, and young depressives with personality disorder; and Kiloh and others (11) , who used multivariate analysis to define endogenous depression as a categorical illness and neurotic depression as a dimensional condition that included young individuals with personality disorders, those with anxiety and depression, and those who were angry and hostile.
As a result of such studies, there appeared to be agreement that there was one depression that was reasonably well defined, no matter what the statistical technique, as well as a range of other depressions. This was consistent with the endogenous and psychotic terms, which were generally considered to be synonymous, as were the reactive and neurotic terms. Kendell noted that either pair of terms could be used to denote two contrasting syndromes-the one consisting of severe, unvarying depressions, often with an acute onset, and accompanied by retardation, guilt, diurnal variation of mood and severe insomnia and weight loss; the other consisting of milder illnesses (3, p 17) .
This delineation also appeared to fit with Pollitt's postulation of a "depressive functional shift" to describe the physiological symptoms that defined endogenous depression. He noted that this was an attempt "to find a nucleus of depressive illness; a timeless clinical index which, while being independent of culture and era, could be confidently assessed and communicated" (12, p 1174). Pollitt added that the concept's value was that "a functional shift, however small, could be useful in distinguishing depressive illness from natural unhappiness" (12, p 1178) . Such a concept was analogous to myocardial infarction and angina: cardiologists had the benefit of electrocardiogram readings and enzyme changes (the functional shift) to delineate the boundary between infarction and angina, but psychiatrists had no such measures (13) .
Notwithstanding the apparent clinical utility of these conceptualisations of depression, continuing unease was clearly felt in some academic circles, and the limitations of the statistical methods used to produce the previously noted classifications were beginning to be appreciated (3). This sentiment was so prevalent that, in his review, Kendell commented on "the complexity, and the absurdity, of the present situation" (3, p 15) . That such strong words would be used makes it amply evident that not all would be placated by any new classification.
Later US Influence
The previously noted studies emerged from Europe and Great Britain, and it was not until the early 1970s, when the Feighner (14) criteria for depression were published, that US psychiatrists emerged from what Paykel described as the "diagnostically dark days of psychoanalytic ascendancy in the 1950s and 1960s" (15) . These new criteria led to the so-called research diagnostic criteria (16) , which appear to have formed the basis for the definitions of major depression and other mood disorders in the American Psychiatric Association's DSM-III, published in 1980, and its subsequent revisions (17) .
The DSM not only provides operational definitions of broad depressive syndromes such as major depressive and dysthymic disorders, it also contains specifiers to describe the clinical severity of the current episode. These specifiers include mild, moderate, and severe; and with or without psychotic features. Other specifiers refer to, for example, catatonic or melancholic features. criticized in that, although there are individual codes for the disorder and for the mild, moderate, and severe specifiers of it (with the latter being with or without psychotic features), there is no code for other specifiers such as "with melancholic features." This is unexpected, as the melancholic features specifier is described in detail, with reference not only to the quality of the mood disturbance but also to the fact that "psychomotor changes are nearly always present and are observable by others"; further, biological changes (for example, dexamethasone nonsupression) are more likely to be present and there is "a greater need for active antidepressant treatment" (17, p 419).
The DSM has proven to be influential, not only in US psychiatry but also as an international tool for psychiatric research. However, it is not the official diagnostic system of the World Health Organization, which uses the ICD for intercountry comparisons. Nevertheless, congruence between the DSM and the ICD is striking, and their similarities and differences have been well reviewed by Paykel , who urged that the "small differences in definitions [be] ironed out and a single set used both clinically and for research" (15, p 94) and that the resulting criteria be based on the "simpler" DSM.
Notwithstanding the general similarities of the DSM and ICD nosological systems (and Paykel's view that they could usefully be combined with minor modification), continuing concern has been expressed about the nosology of mood disorders, most particularly by Parker (18-23).
Parker's Position
Parker has an engaging literary style of writing and presenting data, with frequent use of metaphors, and at times seems to infer that any questioning of his thesis is to defy common sense. Indeed, his use of such language allows one a certain freedom of response in this submission, which more austere scientific writing would preclude, and his gracious acceptance of this is acknowledged.
Consider the title of his seminal paper, "Classifying Depression: Should Paradigms Lost Be Regained?" (18) with its allusion to John Milton and a return to the paradise of melancholia as a main descriptor for depression. To pursue the Milton analogy, this could be interpreted as somewhat messianic, with Parker leading the return to melancholia and producing a more ordered world, analogous to Jesus overcoming the temptations of Satan in Milton's second great work. However, this appears to be done without an apparent recognition of the multitude of meanings of depression and melancholia in the 19th century literature. Further, Parker's use of such terms as "mole hills into mountains" and "man on the Clapham bus" (23) reminds one of the comment on the work of linguist George Lakoff that "anyone who wishes to 'sell' a contentious idea will use metaphors" (24, p 6).
Parker (18) (19) (20) has criticized what he has referred to as the "dumbed down" view of depression suggested by the widespread use of the category of major depression. By contrast, the essential features of his delineation of depression are that there may be nonmelancholic and melancholic depressions as well as "psychotic melancholia." The latter 2 categories do not appear to be substantially different from the DSM classification system, where melancholic and psychotic specifiers are included. He noted that those conditions had recognizable symptoms and responded better to biological treatments, but that is also well described in the DSM.
However, his further classification of nonmelancholic depression is distinctly different. Initially, he referred to the personality attributes of those with nonmelancholic depression as "internalising" and "externalising" (19) , and those categories have been teased out further to 8 dimensions of personality style, along with the dimensions of cooperativeness and effectiveness (20) . These dimensions have been subjected to various investigations of utility in terms of diagnosis and treatment outcome (21, 22) .
It was perhaps harsh of Fahy to describe Parker's classification as "idiosyncratic" (25) . However, his melancholic and psychotic syndromes appear to be accommodated in the DSM, and it is doubtful whether the nonmelancholic categories offer more than the typologies formulated over 30 years ago by Overall and others (8), Paykel (10) , and Kiloh and others (11) . Indeed, in terms of whether such distinctions were clinically useful, one could even go back to the 19th century classifications of Esquirol and Billod, as referred to by Berrios (2), or to the more than 30 types of melancholia described by Tuke in 1892 (4) . Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose !
Clinical Utility
Ultimately, the value of any diagnostic categorization will be determined by its clinical utility. Practice guidelines based on the DSM nosology have been published in the US (26), Canadian (27) , and Australian (28) literature and provide what appear to have been generally accepted algorithms for the management of various depressive syndromes. Not unexpectedly, these guidelines have been criticized by Parker (23) . However, his initial description of treatment options (20) for both internalizing and externalizing nonmelancholic depression was identical except for his statements that, for internalizing individuals, selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) are "very effective" and psychotherapy "may be useful and effective," whereas for externalizing individuals, SSRIs are "sometimes very effective" and psychotherapy was found "useful and often effective." He has provided more specific treatments for his expanded nonmelancholic personality style categories (20) (21) (22) but has acknowledged that these personality styles are not discrete and any single individual may have several dimensions. Naturally, this reduces the specificity of any particular intervention, and it is not unexpected when he acknowledges that medication is appropriate if psychotherapy is not effective (20) . This is hardly unanticipated, as all individuals with clinically significant depression should have the potential benefit of some form of psychotherapy and some will additionally require medication; as the DSM-IV states, those with melancholic features have a "a greater need for active antidepressant treatment" (17, p 419) . It is also pertinent that some longitudinal studies, such as those of Klein and others (29) and Judd and others (30) , have reported a variability of depressive symptoms in the same individual over time, indicating that we are not always dealing with distinct disorders. Indeed, taking cross-sectional analyses at various times with the hope of clearly defining specific syndromal types is akin to attempting to hit a moving target-a target that also has changing characteristics.
Parker has criticized the use of the specifiers mild, moderate, and severe, as well as associated concepts such as subsyndromal depressive conditions. However, the utility of the severity specifier has been demonstrated by Kessing, using Danish population registers in which the risk of relapse and suicide was demonstrated to be "significantly different for the three types of depression" (31, p 153) . That study was based on ICD specifiers, which are virtually identical to those of the DSM, as was other work by Kessing (32) that showed the utility of the categorization of depression in those with and without psychotic features, although, contrary to what might be anticipated on the basis of Parker's postulates, the melancholic-nonmelancholic split did not have any long-term predictive value.
Parker's views on the lack of value in the DSM's definition of subsyndromal depressive disorders are not shared by all. The morbidity and use of services among individuals so delineated is considerable (33) , and the descriptors have predictive value in terms of subsequent conversion to definite depressive syndromes (34, 35) . Further, Okasha (36) has singled out subsyndromal disorders as being an area of psychiatric research that should be given priority.
Conclusion
The continuing debate about the classification of depression will likely never be resolved to everyone's satisfaction. Indeed, Balon's view (37) appears to be pertinent to this debate-the interpretation of psychiatric data may, like beauty, be in the eyes of the beholder. It is also probable that the next substantive advance in this area will not be made by clinical phenomenological descriptions, as has occurred over the last 200 years, but rather by biological markers, as foreshadowed in Leonard's presentation on "The Chemistry of Black Bile" (38) at the recent conference of the Collegium Internationale Neuro-Psychopharmacologicum in Chicago. However, the expectation of imminent solutions by biological psychiatry may be as illusory as our past reliance on phenomenology. For example, the complexity of gene-environment interaction has become increasingly evident since the seminal work of Caspi and others (39) , who reported a genetic susceptibility to depression, as opposed to inevitable illness due to genetic factors. Indeed, that work has been replicated elsewhere, including by colleagues from Parker's own institution (40) .
The result of this brief review leads inevitably to the conclusion that there remains a degree of uncertainty about the nosology of depression, an uncertainty that mirrors life. Until further biological refinement occurs, the DSM classifications appear to be the most clinically useful way in which to conceptualize mood disorders.
